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Fairness in FCPA Enforcement: A Call
for Self-Restraint and Transparency in
Multijurisdictional Anti-Bribery
Enforcement Actions
Jessie M. Reniere*
INTRODUCTION

In September 2017, a Swedish company agreed to pay
approximately $483 million to the U.S. Treasury general fund in
fines, penalties, and disgorgement for bribing an Uzbek public
official in order to secure improper business advantages.1 That
company was also prosecuted by Sweden and the Netherlands and
agreed to pay approximately $965 million total to the three
countries involved.2 The United States, with seemingly weak
connections to the case, collected nearly half of the global
settlement for the U.S. Treasury. It is unclear what the United
States policy interest was in prosecuting foreign bribery that, on
its face, had little to do with the United States, especially when
other countries with stronger connections were also prosecuting
the company.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2019. The author would like to thank Professor Louise Ellen Teitz and
Professor William B.F. Steinman for their invaluable guidance and support.
1. See discussion infra section II.B.i; see also Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Telia Company AB and Its Uzbek Subsidiary Enter Into a Global
Foreign Bribery Resolution of More Than $965 Million for Corrupt Payments
in Uzb. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telia-company-ab-andits-uzbek-subsidiary-enter-global-foreign-bribery-resolution-more-965
[https://perma.cc/Q94A-LN3A].
2. Id.
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The United States has been the global leader in the fight
against foreign bribery and was the first country to explicitly
prohibit its citizens and companies from bribing foreign officials.3
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has stated that “bribery is a widespread phenomenon in
international business transactions, including trade and
investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns,
undermines good governance and economic development, and
distorts international competitive conditions.”4 It is estimated
that as much as $1.5 trillion each year are paid as bribes to
foreign officials in order to secure improper advantages in
international business.5 While foreign bribery has significant
negative consequences in international business, it also
particularly harms developing countries.6 The State Department
describes foreign bribery as having “pernicious effects” on
“economic development, rule of law, and democracy.”7
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the U.S. law that
bans foreign bribery, was enacted as a response to the Watergate
scandal.8 Prior to the FCPA’s enactment, the United States did
not expressly prohibit bribing foreign officials or require disclosure

3. Spotlight: History of the FCPA, PBS (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/history-of-thefcpa.html [https://perma.cc/MFM2-2WX4].
4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions pmbl., Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD
Convention].
5. Daniel Kaufmann, Myths and Realities of Governance and
Corruption, WORLD BANK 81, 83, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/2-1_Governance_and_Corruption_
Kaufmann.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY3Y-XC4X] (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
6. Alexandra Wrage, Bribery is Bad. . . for Business, FORBES (Jan. 25,
2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrawrage/2017/01/25/
bribery-is-bad-for-business/#4e1fcbb64a42 [https://perma.cc/ZRZ5-42TB]; see
Corruption: Cost for Developing Countries, TRANSPARENCY INT’L U.K.,
http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/corruption-statistics/corruptioncost-for-developing-countries/#.WsU4QyPMzOQ
[https://perma.cc/2YU5MUJA] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
7. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN BRIBERY, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/
ifd/oma/foreignbribery/index.htm [https://perma.cc/62CM-8Q94] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2018).
8. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS xvii (2nd ed. 2010).
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of any foreign bribery.9 The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) began looking into allegations that leading U.S.
corporations had made undisclosed payments to President Nixon’s
re-election campaign in return for political favors from the
administration.10 It discovered that hundreds of companies had
been hiding millions of dollars in slush funds to be used for a
number of different purposes, including making illicit payments to
foreign officials.11
Congress recognized that foreign bribery has consequences for
United States foreign policy.12 Furthermore, Congress was
motivated by “post-Watergate morality” and the idea that by
prohibiting these payments, U.S. companies would be able to
resist the demand for them.13 Enacting anti-bribery legislation
would also show that the United States was taking a global
leadership position on the issue.14 President Carter signed the
9. DAVID A. STEIGER, TRANSACTIONS WITHOUT BORDERS: A CLIENT AND
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 129 (2014).
10.
Id.; MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW
ERA 3 (2014).
11. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 129; KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 3.
12. In recognition of that fact, Senator Frank Church’s committee (the
Church Committee) held several hearings on the topic, focusing on U.S.
corporate political contributions to foreign officials. KOEHLER, supra note 10,
at 3–4. During one of the hearings, Senator Church said that American
companies’ participation in foreign bribery “only serve[s] to discredit them
and the United States. Ultimately, [foreign bribery] create[s] the conditions
which bring to power political forces that are no friends of ours . . . .” Id. at 6.
He further stated that,
[p]ayments by Lockheed alone may very well advance the
communists in Italy. In Japan, a mainstay of our foreign policy in
the Far East, the government is reeling as a consequence of
payments by Lockheed. Inquiries have begun in many other
countries. The Communist bloc chortles with glee at the sight of
corrupt capitalism.
Id. at 7. Representative Robert Nix, who chaired the House hearings on
the issue, said, “[t]he interference in democratic elections with corporate
gifts undermines everything we are trying to do as a leader of the free
world.” Id. at 6.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. Representative Stephen Solarz stated during a House hearing,
[w]hat is at stake here is . . . the reputation of our own country . . .
we have an obligation to set a standard of honesty and integrity in
our business dealings not only at home but also abroad which will be
a beacon for the light of integrity for the rest of the world.
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FCPA into law on December 19, 1977,15 and while enforcement
was almost non-existent from the time of the statute’s enactment
until roughly 2002, the FCPA has become a crucial compliance
issue for companies now that U.S. enforcement agencies
aggressively pursue FCPA violations.16
Other countries have enacted and begun to enforce their own
anti-bribery laws, leading to overlapping jurisdiction in FCPA
cases.17 The FCPA gives the United States expansive jurisdiction
to prosecute foreign bribery cases, and other countries’ antibribery laws give them similarly expansive jurisdiction.18 When a
company pays a bribe to a foreign official, two countries already
have jurisdiction—the country where the company is based and
the country in which the foreign official is based.19 In many
situations, several other countries may also have jurisdictional
ties to the case.20 Due to this overlapping jurisdiction, companies
may face prosecution multiple times for the same underlying
misconduct.21
There is no existing law to prevent the United States from
prosecuting companies that have already resolved bribery charges
with other countries.22 Double jeopardy does not apply to
Id. at 7–8.
15. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 129. It has been amended twice since then,
in 1988 and 1998. DEMING, supra note 8, at 3.
16. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L.
907, 913 (2010); KOEHLER, supra note 10, at xii.
17. Jay Holtmeier, Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for
Measured Coordination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2015).
18. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Double Jeopardy: The OECD AntiBribery Convention and the FCPA, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1321, 1326–30 (2012).
19. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 496.
20. Id.
21. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1329.
22. Frederick T. Davis, International Double Jeopardy: US Prosecutions
and the Developing Law in Europe, 31 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 57, 65 (2016). The
United States did sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) in 1966, which provides that “‘[n]o one shall be liable to be
tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each
country.’” Id. at 76 (alteration in original). However, the United States
expressly stated upon signing the ICCPR “that it did not create any
enforceable rights in the United States” and noted “its ‘understanding’ that
‘the prohibition upon double jeopardy . . . [applies] only when the judgment of
acquittal has been rendered by a court of the same governmental unit . . . as
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prosecutions brought by separate sovereigns under their own
distinct laws, and the primary international anti-bribery treaty—
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention)—does not provide a binding mechanism to address
the issue of duplicative enforcement actions.23 Given the FCPA’s
relatively broad jurisdictional reach, and the aggressive stance of
the U.S. enforcement agencies, there are instances when the
United States is involved in multijurisdictional enforcement
actions even though its ties to the matter are weak. Furthermore,
it is difficult to discern clear patterns from recent
multijurisdictional enforcement actions to explain U.S.
enforcement policy or the reasoning behind U.S. portions of total
global settlements.
This Comment makes two arguments. First,
U.S.
enforcement agencies could adopt a policy of self-restraint in
foreign bribery cases by declining to prosecute when there is no
strong public policy reason for United States involvement.
Second, U.S. enforcement agencies should make their enforcement
policy more transparent, specifically as to the justification for
pursuing cases where there are minimal jurisdictional ties, and as
to the reasoning behind the portion of global settlement money
U.S. enforcement agencies take.
Expansive jurisdiction is not necessarily undesirable—in fact,
having many countries with broad and overlapping jurisdiction
helps to ensure that companies that have engaged in corrupt acts
do not “slip through the cracks.” However, it would be better from
a policy perspective for each country, particularly the aggressive
enforcers like the United States, to show self-restraint in
multijurisdictional cases given that companies are extremely
unlikely to fight the charges.24 Furthermore, unpredictable
is seeking a new trial for the same cause.’” Id. at 99 (alteration in original).
The ICCPR has not been successfully used as a valid defense in United States
courts because the treaty is not “self-executing.” Id.
23. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1322–23; Davis, supra note 22, at 62.
There are other global and regional anti-corruption treaties, but this
Comment will focus only on the OECD Convention.
24. Koehler, supra note 16, at 927 (“Simply put, challenging the DOJ is
too risky. In fact, no company has challenged the DOJ in an FCPA
enforcement action in the last twenty years.”). Furthermore, cooperation
with the Department of Justice is one of the key factors in the DOJ’s decision
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enforcement policy and the potential for duplicative enforcement
actions can deter companies from self-reporting any violations and
can discourage cooperation with enforcement agencies.25 This is
counterproductive to the purpose and goals of global anti-bribery
laws—eliminating foreign bribery from international business
transactions.26 The new Department of Justice (DOJ) policy
against “piling on,” announced in May 2018, is an
acknowledgment of the problem and a step in the right direction,
but the policy itself lacks concrete detail and therefore still does
not create predictability.27
As described above, this Comment argues for a policy of both
self-restraint and transparency in multijurisdictional enforcement
actions, rather than the application of a strict double jeopardy
style rule under which multijurisdictional violations are
prosecuted by only one enforcement authority. The United States
has led the way in creating a more level playing field in
international business, and at this point, not enough other
countries consistently enforce their anti-bribery laws to justify the
United States retreating from multijurisdictional enforcement in
all cases.28 There are likely situations when other countries’
of whether or not to bring a criminal indictment, and “to challenge the DOJ’s
theories, its interpretation of facts, or to raise valid and legitimate FCPA
defenses is not to cooperate with the investigation . . . .” Id. at 925.
25. See Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 514–17.
26. See id.
27. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks to the New York City
Bar White Collar Crime Institute (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-rosenstein-delivers-remarksnew-york-city-bar-white-collar [https://perma.cc/CM5X-NCPF].
28. From 1977 through 2017 there were 349 foreign bribery enforcement
actions worldwide, and the United States was responsible for 236 of those
(68%). Global Enforcement Report 2017, TRACE INT’L (Mar. 2018),
https://traceinternational.org/Uploads/PublicationFiles/GER2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TCF7-L979]. European countries account for 27%, while
Asia Pacific, the Americas (excluding the United States), and the Middle East
each accounted for 3% or less. Id. As of 2012, only seven of thirty-seven
countries (most of the parties to the OECD Convention, at the time) were
designated as having “active enforcement.” Exporting Corruption? Country
Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Progress Report 2012,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Sept. 6, 2012), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/
publication/exporting_corruption_country_enforcement_of_the_oecd_anti_bri
bery_conventio [https://perma.cc/V8R2-ZBJB].
Twelve countries were
deemed to have “moderate enforcement,” while the remaining eighteen were
classified as having “little enforcement” or “no enforcement.” Id.
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enforcement actions are not strong enough to properly deter and
punish companies for their corrupt acts, or when the countries
that should prosecute choose not to, for whatever reason. The
United States should be able to insert itself into these situations
when there are good policy reasons to do so. However, U.S.
enforcement agencies can be clearer in their public statements
about the reasons for involvement in those cases, and might
refrain from action in situations where there is no policy reason or
need for United States involvement.
Part I of this Comment provides a basic overview of the
FCPA’s statutory provisions, the enforcement agencies and
enforcement mechanisms, and the scope of U.S. jurisdiction. Part
II examines the issue of overlapping jurisdiction in foreign bribery
cases and analyzes the four multijurisdictional enforcement
actions resolved in 2017. Part III proposes increased self-restraint
and transparency in U.S. enforcement policy, supported by the
U.S. approach to state-federal successive prosecutions and the
spirit of the OECD Convention’s jurisdiction provisions.
I.

FCPA FUNDAMENTALS

This Part provides a basic overview of the FCPA. While the
general idea behind the statute is easy to understand—paying
bribes to foreign officials to obtain or retain business is
prohibited—in practice it is much more complex. Subpart A
describes the main statutory provisions—the anti-bribery and
accounting provisions. Subpart B reviews the United States
agencies that enforce FCPA violations and the means by which
they resolve FCPA cases with companies, often with little or no
judicial oversight. Subpart C explains the fines and penalties
companies face, including the relatively new use of civil
disgorgement, which has contributed to the enormous settlement
amounts seen today. Finally, Subpart D covers the FCPA’s widereaching jurisdictional coverage and the implications for
companies operating internationally.
A. The Anti-Bribery and Accounting Provisions
The FCPA has two main sets of provisions: the anti-bribery
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provisions and the accounting provisions.29 The two sets of
provisions “were intended to work in tandem and thereby
complement one another.”30 The anti-bribery provisions generally
prohibit corrupt payments to foreign officials made to assist with
obtaining or retaining business.31
The accounting provisions themselves impose two separate
requirements on all companies, regardless of where they are based
or established, that maintain a class of securities registered on a
United States exchange, or that are otherwise required to file
reports with the SEC.32 These companies are referred to as
“issuers.”33 First, issuers must adhere to the so-called books and
records provision, which obliges issuers to keep accurate books,
records, and accounts.34 In other words, if a company bribes a
foreign official and does not record that bribe in its books and
records, or records the charge but does not accurately describe it
as an illicit payment, it has violated the accounting and
recordkeeping provisions.35 Thus, any company found in violation
of the anti-bribery provisions will most likely be in violation of the
books and records provision as well, as it is highly unlikely a
company would accurately record bribes on its books.36
Second, issuers are required to devise and maintain adequate
internal controls to ensure that funds are expended in accordance
with management’s general and specific authorizations.37
Essentially, the internal controls provision compels issuers to
implement and adhere to written compliance procedures as to how
they spend corporate funds.38 In many FCPA enforcement
29. DEMING, supra note 8, at 3–4.
30. Id. at 4.
31. ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL
LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS 1 (2nd ed. 2012).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2012).
33. Id. § 78m(a).
34. Id. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A); TARUN, supra note 31, at 1, 13.
35. TARUN, supra note 31, at 13.
36. See id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
38. CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV. OF THE SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 38, 40 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WUJ5-GPYK]
[hereinafter
FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE].
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actions, companies found in violation of the anti-bribery provisions
are also found to have violated the internal controls requirement;
the logic is that if the company had sufficient internal controls,
they would have prevented any misconduct.39
Although the anti-bribery provisions may seem simple on
their face, they are in fact quite complex and companies may
easily run afoul of them. A payment does not need to actually be
made for there to be an anti-bribery violation; an offer, promise, or
authorization of a corrupt payment will suffice.40 Furthermore,
the definition of “foreign official” is quite expansive. The
definition provided in the statute is:
Any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or of a
public international organization, or any person acting in
an official capacity or on behalf of any such government,
department, agency or instrumentality or for, or on behalf
of, any such public international organization.41
Moreover, the anti-bribery provisions also apply to illicit
payments rendered to foreign political parties, party officials,
candidates for office, employees of state-owned enterprises, and
officials of quasi-governmental agencies.42
The payment, or offer of payment, must be made “corruptly”
but can take many forms.43 It can be money, but “anything of
value” is considered a bribe.44 Enforcement actions demonstrate
that, in addition to funds, bribes can be lavish trips, gifts in-kind,
39. Id. at 40.
40. TARUN, supra note 31, at 3. The DOJ also frequently charges
companies and individuals with conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA. Id. at 17–18.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A); § 78dd-(2)(h)(2)(A); § 78dd-3(f)(2)(A)
(2012).
42. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 19–21; see United States v.
Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014) (laying out the factors for
determining whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign
government); see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v.
Olympus Latin America, Inc., No. 16-3525(MF) (D.N.J. Mar. 1 2016)
(available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/831256/download
[https://perma.cc/Z58S-55LJ]) (holding that doctors at state-owned hospitals
were government officials).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); § 78dd-2(a); §78dd-3(a).
44. Id.
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and even employment provided to a foreign official’s relatives.45
There is no de minimis exception.46
A company may also be liable for bribes offered or paid by any
third-party agents the company has hired to assist in foreign
jurisdictions, such as marketing representatives, consultants,
joint venture partners, distributors, law firms, or accountants.47
The company must have had knowledge of the third-party agent’s
actions, but that knowledge could be actual or constructive.48 The
knowledge requirement is met if a person is aware that there is a
high probability that an improper payment will be made or
offered.49 “Willful blindness,” “deliberate ignorance,” and “taking
a ‘head-in-the-sand’” attitude all constitute knowledge under the
FCPA.50 These third-party agent relationships present a serious
compliance challenge for companies:51 “[B]ecause of respondeat
superior and the realities of the global marketplace, FCPA
compliance can be difficult for even the most well-managed and
well-intentioned business organizations with a commitment to

45. TARUN, supra note 31, at 4. In 2015, BNY Mellon faced FCPA
charges for providing student internships to government officials’ family
members; the interns in question did not go through the company’s
competitive hiring process. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Charges BNY Mellon with FCPA Violations (Aug. 18, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html
[https://perma.cc/MN48-VHYY]).
46. TARUN, supra note 31, at 4. The FCPA does contain an exception for
so-called “facilitating payments” or “grease payments,” but it is questionable
how much this exception helps companies during an investigation. KOEHLER,
supra note 10, at 120. “Facilitating payments” are defined as “facilitating or
expediting payment[s] to a foreign official . . . the purpose of which is to
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine government action by a
foreign official . . . .” Id. at 116. Some examples the statute gives of “routine
government action” include obtaining permits, licenses, or other documents to
do business in that country; processing visas and work orders; and scheduling
inspections. Id. at 117. Despite the legal authority for the exception, many
FCPA enforcement actions today concern payments made or offered for the
purpose of obtaining permits, licenses, or other documents to do business in a
particular country; in fact, the SEC’s former Assistant Director of
Enforcement has called the facilitating payment exception “illusory.” Id. at
119–20.
47. TARUN, supra note 31, at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. DEMING, supra note 8, at 60.
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FCPA compliance.”52
If a company or individual is accused of having made an
improper payment, there are two affirmative defenses that may be
raised: the reasonable and bona fide expenditures defense and the
local law defense.53 The reasonable and bona fide expenditures
defense applies to:
the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value
that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide
expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses,
incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official . . . and was
directly related to: (a) the promotion, demonstration, or
explanation of products or services; or (b) the execution or
performance of a contract with a foreign government or
agency thereof.54
The local law defense applies when the payment in question is
actually permissible under the written law of the foreign official’s
country, with emphasis on written law: the fact that the practice is
customary or widespread in a certain country is not sufficient.55
While companies make payments every day that qualify as bona
fide expenditures,56 the local law defense in practice will not
provide much help to a company under investigation.57
B. Enforcement Agencies and Resolution Vehicles
In the U.S., two agencies are responsible for enforcing FCPA
violations, and they often both bring enforcement actions for the

52. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 54.
53. Id. at 120–21.
54. Id. at 123.
55. Id. at 121. In United States v. Kozeny, the defendant alleged that he
would have been “free from criminal responsibility” under the laws of
Azerbaijan, the country of the foreign official in question and, therefore, he
should be able to invoke the local law exception. Id. at 121–22 (referring to
582 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). The court disagreed and found that the
payment was in fact illegal, even if the defendant would not have been
prosecuted in Azerbaijan due to a technicality. Id.
56. Bill Steinman, Bill Steinman: How to Handle Mandated Per Diems
with Foreign Government Customers, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016, 10:08 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/3/2/bill-steinman-how-to-handlemandated-per-diems-with-foreign.html [https://perma.cc/KW6G-G33Y].
57. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 152.
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same instance of misconduct.58 The DOJ is responsible for
bringing all criminal charges, both for the anti-bribery provisions
and for willful violations of the accounting and record-keeping
provisions.59 The SEC brings civil actions for violations of the antibribery provisions and accounting and record-keeping provisions;
the SEC only has jurisdiction over issuers and individuals acting
on behalf of issuers.60 The DOJ also brings civil actions against
all companies and individuals not covered by the SEC’s
authority.61 If both enforcement agencies have jurisdiction in a
particular case, they will “typically conduct parallel or joint
investigations” and will bring “simultaneous criminal charges,
civil complaints, deferred prosecution agreements, and/or consent
decrees.”62
FCPA cases against companies very rarely go to trial.63
Instead, the DOJ and SEC use other means to resolve FCPA
matters. The DOJ resolves criminal matters with companies
through plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, nonprosecution agreements, and declinations.64 Plea agreements are
reserved for the most egregious cases of misconduct, typically
where senior management was involved in the bribery, or where
the company failed to voluntarily disclose the misconduct or
cooperate with the enforcement agencies.65
In most instances when companies are subject to criminal
prosecution for FCPA violations, those companies will enter into a
non-prosecution agreement or deferred-prosecution agreement
with the DOJ.66 A non-prosecution agreement (NPA) is a formal,
written agreement in which the enforcement agency agrees not to
pursue an action and the company agrees to cooperate fully, but
58. DEMING, supra note 8, at 75–76.
59. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 54.
60. DEMING, supra note 8, at 75; KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 54–55.
61. DEMING, supra note 8, at 75.
62. TARUN, supra note 31, at 249.
63. Koehler, supra note 16, at 927.
64. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 74.
65. Id.
66. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79; Koehler, supra note 16, at 928, 933.
“The DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs has exploded in recent years. Professor
Peter Henning, a former DOJ prosecutor and SEC enforcement official,
recently noted that NPAs and DPAs ‘have become almost the accepted norm’
and ‘there is even an expectation that companies will receive them.’”
Koehler, supra note 16, at 933.
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no formal charges are filed: the agreement is maintained by the
DOJ and the company.67 In a deferred prosecution agreement
(DPA), on the other hand, the enforcement agency files formal
charges in the appropriate court and agrees not to proceed with
the enforcement action if the company agrees to cooperate fully
during the deferred prosecution period.68
While NPAs and DPAs are beneficial for companies seeking to
bring the matter to a speedy resolution,69 there is very little
judicial scrutiny of those agreements, which may give the
enforcement agencies “unchecked power subject to abuse.”70
There is no judicial scrutiny of NPAs, given that they are not filed
with a court; DPAs are, in theory, subject to judicial scrutiny
because they are filed with a court, but in practice there is little
judicial oversight:71
[T]he first-of-its-kind [Government Accountability Office]
report found that judges routinely “rubber-stamp” DPAs
without inquiring into whether factual evidence exists to
support the essential elements of the crime “alleged” or to
determine whether valid and legitimate defenses are
relevant to the “alleged” conduct. In fact, no court has
ever rejected an NPA or DPA and all “have been approved
without judicial modification.”72
Despite the benefits of non-prosecution or deferred
prosecution to companies, these agreements lead to unfairness in
the resolution process. Commentators have noted that “[t]hese
agreements are made under duress. The economic reality is that
if the corporation refuses to assent to the [DPA], the result will
likely be the death of the corporation or alternatively, severe
financial consequences that will gravely injure the corporation.”73
67. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79; Koehler, supra note 16, at 928–29.
68. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79; Koehler, supra note 16, at 928.
69. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79.
70. Koehler, supra note 16, at 938.
71. Id. at 935.
72. Id. at 936.
73. Id. at 937–38 (citing Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate
Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY.
L. J. 1, 14 (2007)). The classic example of this is Arthur Anderson, “a
company that died upon criminal conviction notwithstanding the fact that the
U.S. Supreme Court later reversed its conviction.” Id. at 938.
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As a result, U.S. enforcement agencies are able to push the
boundaries of their jurisdiction, and companies accept the
enforcement agencies’ interpretation of the law, even if a court
might reach a different conclusion.74
The remaining way the DOJ resolves FCPA matters with
companies is through declinations—in other words, the DOJ
declines to bring charges altogether.75 The DOJ exercises this
option when a company self-discloses the misconduct to the
enforcement agencies and fully cooperates in the investigation.76
The DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy, formerly known as the
Pilot Program, does presume that companies will receive a
declination if they meet the policy’s criteria.77 However, it can be
74. Id. at 907, 946.
75. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 75.
76. Id. at 77–79. See the Morgan Stanley 2012 declination for example.
Recent Declination in Morgan Stanley DOJ Case Spells Out Keys to Effective
FCPA Compliance
Policy,
LEXISNEXIS,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/
communities/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2012/10/14/rec
ent-declination-in-morgan-stanley-doj-case-spells-out-keys-to-effective-fcpacompliance-policy.aspx [https://perma.cc/5AR6-AFR2] (last visited Oct. 10,
2018); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing
Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by
FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-morgan-stanleymanaging-director-pleads-guilty-role-evading-internal-controls-required
[https://perma.cc/6NUG-D68P].
77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-47.120
(2018) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977#9-47.120 [https://perma.cc/T74965XQ]. The Pilot Program was announced by the DOJ in 2016 as a one-year
program to try to encourage more companies to voluntarily disclose FCPA
violations. If a company met the program’s criteria, it would be eligible for
significant benefits in resolving the matter with the DOJ. Dept. of Justice,
Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot Program (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/criminal-division-launches-newfcpa-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/QZ43-ATFD]. In November 2017, the
DOJ announced that the Pilot Program would be made permanent and would
be incorporated into the United States Attorney’s Manual as the Corporate
Enforcement Policy. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the
34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29,
2017) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorneygeneral-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign
[https://perma.cc/Z59X-GWYU]. The Corporate Enforcement Policy made
certain changes to the terms of the Pilot Program that are actually more
beneficial for companies. See Bill Steinman, Bill Steinman: What’s New
About the DOJ’s New FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy?, FCPA BLOG (Dec.
1, 2017, 8:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/12/1/bill-steinmanwhats-new-about-the-dojs-new-fcpa-corporate-en.html
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difficult for companies to meet all of the policy’s vague
requirements to the DOJ’s satisfaction.78
The SEC also utilizes DPAs, NPAs, and declinations the way
the DOJ does. However, it has some other resolution options at its
disposal at well. The SEC can obtain a civil injunction through a
court order.79 This was the traditional method for resolving FCPA
cases, but the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank) has led to an increase
in FCPA cases being resolved in administrative courts before
administrative law judges.80 This is because Dodd-Frank allows
the SEC to impose civil penalties through administrative
proceedings.81
C. Fines and Penalties
Although the statute provides limits for fines, total
settlements in FCPA cases are continually increasing. For antibribery violations, the statutory limit on criminal fines for
individuals is $250,000; companies may be subject to a fine of up
to $2 million.82 For criminal accounting and record-keeping
violations, individuals may be fined up to $5 million while
companies may be fined up to $25 million.83 However, per the
Alternative Fines Act, criminal fines may be increased to “double
the gain or loss resulting from the corrupt payment.”84 This
essentially means that “the statutory amounts are often of little
importance in arriving at actual fine and penalty amounts in a
[https://perma.cc/7APZ-XVGD].
78. See Mike Koehler, Grading the DOJ’s ‘FCPA Corporate Enforcement
Policy’, BLOOMBERG L. WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 24 (2017).
79. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 76.
80. Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 45, 51–52 (2016).
81. Id. at 46.
82. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 153. Individuals may also be subject to a
jail term of up to five years. Id.
83. Id. Individuals may also be subject to a jail term of up to twenty
years. Id.
84. Id. “If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the
offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the
defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or
twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would
unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d)
(2012).

182 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:167
corporate FCPA enforcement action........ ”85
The SEC now often also seeks disgorgement of profits,86
which is in large part responsible for today’s substantial total
settlement amounts.87 Disgorgement was not part of any
settlement agreement until 2004 but since then it “has been used
in the majority of cases and comprises the most significant part of
the SEC’s recovery.”88 In 2016, disgorgement accounted for more
than ninety-seven percent of the SEC’s total monetary recovery in
FCPA enforcement actions—a total of $1.14 billion.89
As mentioned above, FCPA fines and penalties almost always
go to the U.S. Treasury general fund,90 which leads many to
85. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 182. “In practice, Alternative Fines Act
fines often exceed the statutory maximum fine in significant FCPA cases and
enable the DOJ to secure nine-figure megafines.” TARUN, supra note 31, at
19.
86. David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC
Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime:
Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L.
471, 478 (2009).
87. Id. at 484.
88. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 184. One commentator notes that the
SEC’s use of disgorgement is troubling: it is not clear that Congress ever
intended the SEC to seek disgorgement in FCPA cases, and there are
practical difficulties in determining exactly how much money the company
made as a result of the foreign bribery. Weiss, supra note 86, at 473–75.
Furthermore,
[t]he irony in many corporate FCPA enforcement actions is that the
company is otherwise viewed as selling the best product or service
for the best price. With such companies, can it truly be said that the
alleged improper payments were the sole reason the company
secured the contract or other benefit received? Does a but-for
analysis have a place in arriving at FCPA fine and penalty amounts?
In other words, should it be relevant that the company would likely
have secured the contract or other benefit anyway, regardless of the
improper payment?
KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 183. Also, disgorgement in theory must be
proportional to the offense, and given the difficulties in calculating the
amount in foreign bribery cases, it is quite possible that a calculated amount
might be disproportional, therefore constituting a punishment rather than an
equitable remedy. Weiss, supra note 79, at 506. “[D]isgorgement is ill-suited
to the foreign bribery context, in which some disgorgement calculations must
necessarily resemble speculation or, at best, rough estimates.” Id. at 475.
89. Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Supreme Court’s Ruling on Disgorgement
Has Broad Implications for FCPA Matters, FCPA UPDATE 2 (June 2017),
https://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/
2017/06/fcpa_update_june_2017a.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GLJ-VR5J].
90. Scott C. Jansen, What Will $30 Million of the Rolls-Royce Fine Be
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believe that FCPA enforcement is more about generating funds for
the government rather than punishing and deterring corruption.91
Former DOJ and SEC enforcement attorneys have made powerful
statements on the subject. A former Assistant Director of the SEC
Enforcement Division, who assisted in drafting the FCPA, wrote,
“governments will keep pursuing corrupt business practices for
one very simple reason—it’s lucrative.”92 Another former DOJ
prosecutor stated,
This is the one area of government activity that actually
brings money in rather than shoots money out. We’re
talking about literally billions of dollars that the
government is able to collect . . . as long as there’s a
budget issue it’s not too cynical to say that generating
revenue is a factor in bringing these cases.93
The DOJ’s former Assistant Chief for FCPA enforcement,
William Jacobson, also said, “the government sees a profitable
program, and it’s going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it
anymore.”94
These statements potentially explain U.S.
involvement in cases where jurisdictional ties are minimal and
other countries with stronger ties have already initiated their own
enforcement actions.95
Used for?, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2017/2/10/what-will-30-million-of-the-rolls-royce-fine-be-used-for.html
[https://perma.cc/ML83-PA9V].
91. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 238; see also Matthew C. Turk, A Political
Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 325, 346 (2013) (“Not only does enforcement generate positive
revenue for the U.S. government, it also advantages domestic U.S.
corporations that are less heavily investigated or punished relative to their
foreign competitors.”).
92. Michael F. Perlis & Wrenn E. Chais, Investigating the FCPA, FORBES
(Dec. 8, 2009, 1:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/08/foreign-corruptpractices-act-opinions-contributors-michael-perlis-wrenn-chais.html#7403
c2634e81 [https://perma.cc/Z2Z8-Y9VE].
93. Brian Mahoney, FCPA Enforcement Will Stay Robust Beyond
Obama’s 2nd Term, LAW360 (Nov. 6, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://0-www.law360.
com.lawlib.rwu.edu/articles/392138/fcpa-enforcement-will-stay-robust-beyond
-obama-s-2nd-term.
94. Turk, supra note 91, at 352.
95. See KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 238–40. One commentator argues
that U.S. enforcement agencies engage in “rent-seeking,” “in which every
member of the FCPA enforcement apparatus benefits from expanding FCPA
enforcement . . . .” Turk, supra note 91, at 354. Furthermore, “as rents
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It is important to note that U.S. enforcement agencies in
many cases do credit or offset fines and penalties paid to other
countries’ enforcement agencies; this shows some recognition that
it might be unfair for companies to face duplicative penalties for
the same instance of foreign bribery.96 However, there is no
guarantee that a company will receive a credit, and there is little
insight into what U.S. enforcement agencies deem an appropriate
amount to offset.97 Furthermore, duplicative penalties are only
part of the problem for companies facing duplicative enforcement
actions—there are also “burdens and costs” simply by virtue of
being investigated by multiple enforcement agencies.98 Given the
lack of information in FCPA settlement agreements and the lack
of official guidance on the subject, it is difficult to know when and
how much U.S. enforcement agencies will credit for penalties paid
in other jurisdictions.99
D. The FCPA’s Expansive Jurisdiction
The FCPA gives the United States extremely broad
jurisdiction to prosecute foreign bribery, which causes even more
of a compliance concern for companies and individuals.100 The
FCPA provides three bases for jurisdiction.101 First, as explained
above, the FCPA covers “issuers,” which essentially include
publicly traded companies and any other companies that are
become a more important governmental objective, more resources are
invested in detection and punishment [of crimes that produce rents].” Id. at
361 (citing Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with
a Rent-Seeking Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 128 (2002)). He
proposes diverting disgorgement away from the SEC to reduce the
enforcement agencies’ incentive to prosecute “lower-hanging fruit” and
encourage focus on cases with “clearer factual and legal bases.” Id. at 363.
He suggests international organizations or demand-side countries (with
conditions) as potential recipients of disgorgement. Id. at 366–67.
96. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 506–07.
97. Id. at 507.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 507–08. “[W]ithout more visibility into the U.S. settlement
process, or additional guidance from U.S. regulators, it is difficult to infer
anything certain about the SEC’s or DOJ’s policies with respect to U.S.
treatment of foreign antibribery settlements.” Id.
100. See Natasha N. Wilson, Note, Pushing the Limits of Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Actors Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
1063, 1070–71 (2014).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3.
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required to file with the SEC.102 The accounting and
recordkeeping provisions and the internal controls provision of the
FCPA only apply to issuers.103 Officers, directors, agents,
employees, and stockholders of an issuer are also covered by the
FCPA.104
Second, the FCPA covers “domestic concerns.”105 Domestic
concerns include United States citizens, nationals, and residents,
as well as any type of business entity that has its principal place
of business in the United States or is organized under United
States law.106 Like with issuers, the FCPA also covers the
officers, directors, agents, employees, and stockholders of domestic
concerns.107 It is important to note that a United States citizen,
national, or resident need not be physically present in the United
States for the FCPA to apply.108
The first two bases for jurisdiction were part of the FCPA as
originally enacted in 1977.109 The 1998 amendments added a
third jurisdictional basis—territorial jurisdiction.110 Essentially,
anyone who does any “act in furtherance” of a bribe, or an offer to
bribe, “while in the territory of the United States” is subject to the
FCPA, even if they are not an issuer or a domestic concern.111
The enforcement agencies have taken an aggressive stance on
what “while in the territory of the United States” actually
means.112 For example, the enforcement agencies would consider
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; TARUN, supra note 31, at 45.
103. DEMING, supra note 8, at 42.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
106. Id. United States law includes state or federal law, as well as the law
of any territory, possession, or commonwealth. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-2; FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38,
at 10.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3; FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 11.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).
112. See Sean Hecker & Margot Laporte, Should FCPA “Territorial”
Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial Proportions?, 42 A.B.A. INT’L L. NEWS 1,
7–8 (2013); Wilson, supra note 100, at 1071.
“Within” has a particular meaning in this context: to commit an act
“within” the territory actually means causing an act to be committed
within the territory. The 1998 amendment thus established
jurisdiction over anyone who uses the mails, means, or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the United States to
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the sending of emails via U.S.-based servers, or the use of the U.S.
banking system by facilitating bribes in U.S. dollars, as giving the
United States jurisdiction over the bribery.113 Given that
companies almost always settle, the enforcement agencies’
interpretation of territorial jurisdiction has rarely been
challenged.114
In originally enacting the FCPA, Congress excluded from
jurisdictional reach foreign individuals and companies, provided
they were not issuers or domestic concerns.115 It did so out of
concerns about sovereignty issues, foreign policy and diplomatic
relations, and the potential for reciprocal
prosecution.116
However, in 1998, the Senate ratified the OECD Convention,
which requires its signatories to criminalize foreign bribery and
specifically calls for an expansive jurisdictional scope.117 In fact,
the official OECD Commentaries to the Convention state that
“[t]he territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted
broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act
is not required.”118 To comply with the OECD Convention,
facilitate an FCPA violation, even if that person was not physically
present in the United States when acting or otherwise subject to
U.S. jurisdiction as a citizen or issuer.
Wilson, supra note 100, at 1071.
113. See Hecker, supra note 112, at 8; Wilson, supra note 100, at 1071–72.
When banks wish to transact in a location where they do not have a
branch, they can use a correspondent account in that location to
conduct transactions, such as receiving deposits or making
payments. Foreign banks use U.S. correspondent accounts to
facilitate U.S. dollar transactions . . . . In recent enforcement
actions, the DOJ and SEC have signaled that the use of U.S.
correspondent accounts can establish jurisdiction over the foreign
actor conducting the transaction, even when that correspondent
account is the actor’s only link to the United States.
Wilson, supra note 100, at 1072.
114. Hecker, supra note 112, at 8, 10; Wilson, supra note 100, at 1072–73.
115. See Wilson, supra note 100, at 1070.
116. Id.
117. TARUN, supra note 31, at 45; OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art.
4 ¶ 1. “Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is
committed in whole or in part in its territory.” OECD Convention, supra note
4, at art. 4 ¶ 1.
118. Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development,
Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions 25 (1997), available at
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Congress amended the FCPA that same year and broadened the
jurisdictional scope to include foreign corporations and foreign
individuals that bribe, or offer to bribe, foreign officials while “in”
the United States.119 The fact that the United States and all of
the other OECD Convention signatories have statutes conferring
such broad jurisdiction to prosecute foreign bribery cases creates
overlapping jurisdiction that leads to duplicative enforcement
actions.
II. OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Foreign bribery cases by nature involve multiple countries,
and given that the United States and other countries assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction in these cases, there is almost always
overlapping jurisdiction.120 As a result, companies may be subject
to prosecution by multiple countries’ enforcement agencies.121
Unfortunately for companies accused of FCPA violations, the
United States constitutional protection against “double jeopardy”
does not apply in cases involving multiple sovereigns; if the
conduct constitutes a criminal offense in the United States, and
also constitutes a criminal offense in another country, then the
conduct is considered to be a separate violation of law in each
country, even though the violations arose from the same
underlying facts.122
In many instances, the United States does have jurisdiction,
but given that the other countries involved in the enforcement
action have much stronger ties to the case, there is no obvious
public policy reason for the United States to be so heavily
involved. While it is very possible that U.S. enforcement agencies
do, in fact, have good policy reasons for their involvement, and for
the portion of penalties they take in these cases, those reasons are
not made clear to the public.123 From the four multijurisdictional
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–3(a); TARUN, supra note 31, at 45.
120. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 496.
121. Id.
122. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1322.
123. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 510.
It is unclear how U.S. and foreign authorities . . . decide who takes
the lead on an investigation .......... [T]he coordination and division of
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enforcement actions in 2017, it is difficult to discern any patterns
regarding (1) what the United States considers to be a strong tie
to the case, and (2) what portion of total penalties the United
States takes.124
A. Overlapping Jurisdiction as a Result of the OECD Convention
When Congress enacted the FCPA, the United States was the
only country in the world that criminalized bribery of foreign
officials, and as a result, U.S. companies were arguably at a
disadvantage when competing for business in the international
market.125 In amending the FCPA in 1988, Congress expressly
called for the President to negotiate an international agreement
among OECD countries in order to level the playing field in
international business transactions.126 After many years of
diplomatic efforts, the OECD Convention was finalized on
December 17, 1997, requiring all signatories to enact domestic
legislation that criminalized foreign bribery.127 Currently, fortythree countries have ratified the OECD Convention and have

penalties may be a result of horse trading or comity as multiple
regulators that have invested significant resources into the
investigation seek to obtain something to show for it.
Id. The International Foreign Bribery Taskforce (IFBT) is comprised of
law enforcement agencies from the United States, Canada, Australia,
and the United Kingdom, and representatives from those agencies have
stated that in multijurisdictional matters, “the agencies will informally
assign one organization among them to take the leading role in each
multi-jurisdictional investigation. This decision is based not only where
the misconduct has occurred or the situs of most of the evidence, but also
where they’re likely to secure the largest penalty.” Bill Steinman, Bill
Steinman: It’s Time to Meet the International Foreign Bribery Taskforce,
FCPA BLOG (Dec. 7, 2016, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/
12/7/bill-steinman-its-time-to-meet-the-international-foreign-bri.html
[https://perma.cc/C9TD-R43S].
124. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 513.
Identifying patterns and trends . . . can be difficult, and observers
and practitioners may often be reduced to reading proverbial
tealeaves in an attempt to map out the landscape . . . Companies . . .
may be hard pressed to draw neat conclusions from . . . case studies
that, ultimately, provide too little consistency and predictability.
Id.
125. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1325.
126. Id.
127. TARUN, supra note 31, at 55.
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implemented foreign bribery legislation.128
Interestingly, Article 4 of the OECD Convention, which
addresses jurisdiction, requires signatories to establish
jurisdiction when the foreign bribery offense takes place either in
whole or in part within that territory.129 This essentially
guarantees that there will be overlapping jurisdiction in foreign
bribery cases, given that, by nature, foreign bribery takes place in
at least two countries—the country from which the bribe is made,
known as the supply-side country, and the country of the official
who accepts the bribe, known as the demand-side country.130
Furthermore, if a company has foreign subsidiaries that are
involved in the bribery, the country where that subsidiary is
located will also likely have jurisdiction.131 Article 4 also requires
that signatory countries, consistent with their own laws, establish
jurisdiction when its nationals commit foreign bribery offenses
while outside that country; therefore, the home country of any
employee or third-party agent involved in the bribery will also
likely have jurisdiction in a single case.132
B. Trends, or Lack Thereof, in Recent Multijurisdictional
Enforcement Actions
Although the United States is still the primary enforcer of
foreign bribery violations, it is no longer the only game in town.
In 2017, there were 266 foreign bribery investigations conducted
worldwide.133 The United States by itself was responsible for
forty-three percent of all investigations; the United Kingdom, with
the second largest number of investigations, was responsible for
sixteen percent.134 Despite the fact that the United States
128. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, Ratification Status as of May 2017,
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BPJ-6GPC].
129. OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4 ¶ 1.
130. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 496.
131. Id.
132. OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4 ¶ 2; Holtmeier, supra note
17, at 496; Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1326.
133. TRACE International, Inc., Global Enforcement Report 2017, 6 (Mar.
2018), https://traceinternational.org/Uploads/PublicationFiles/GER2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KRQ5-E7TJ].
134. Id. However, enforcement actions brought by European countries,
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conducted nearly half of the total investigations, it was one of
thirty countries that conducted foreign bribery investigations in
2017.135 As more countries begin to enforce their anti-bribery
laws, there likely will be an increase in the number of
multijurisdictional enforcement actions.
The United States participated in four multijurisdictional
enforcement actions in 2017.136 Examining the jurisdictional ties
in each case, and the portion of each total settlement the U.S. took
in comparison to the other countries involved, it is difficult to
come to any conclusions about U.S. enforcement policy.
Companies will likely have difficulty predicting the outcome when
faced with investigations by multiple countries’ enforcement
agencies. This is not only unfair to companies, but also
discourages them from voluntarily disclosing any violations, which
is ultimately counterproductive to the goals of anti-bribery
laws.137
1.

Telia Company AB

In September 2017, Telia Company AB (Telia), a Swedish
telecommunications company, agreed to pay more than $965
million to resolve foreign bribery charges.138 Telia was accused of
having made corrupt payments to Gulnara Karimova (Karimova),
the eldest daughter of the President of Uzbekistan, from 2007 to
at least 2010.139 According to the SEC, Telia made more than
$330 million in improper payments to Karimova, and Karimova
helped Telia generate more than $2.5 billion in revenues.140
when counted together, were responsible for forty-four percent. Id.
135. Id.
136. See discussion infra sections II.B.1–4.
137. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 515–16.
138. Press Release, supra note 1.
139. Ryan Rohlfsen, G. David Rojas & Kendall Scott, In the Third-Largest
FCPA Enforcement Action Ever, Telia Agrees to Pay Almost $1 Billion to
Resolve Bribery Inquiry in Uzbekistan; CEO, Senior Executive, and In-House
Counsel Also
Charged, ROPES & GRAY ALERT (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2017/09/20170922_AC_Alert.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8T6J-87VQ]; Richard L. Cassin, Telia Disgorges $457
Million to SEC, Agrees to $965 Million in Total Penalties for FCPA Offenses,
FCPA BLOG (Sept. 21, 2017, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/
21/telia-disgorges-457-million-to-sec-agrees-to-965-million-in.html
[https://perma.cc/T4E3-6WWC].
140. Telia Co. AB, No. 3-18195 (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept. 21, 2017)
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Specifically, Karimova helped Telia acquire COSCOM LLC, a
telecommunications company that had operations in Uzbekistan;
assisted with obtaining necessary licenses to operate a 3G, and
later 4G, network; and improperly influenced other government
officials in order to help COSCOM acquire the additional phone
numbers it needed to gain more subscribers.141
Though the United States did have jurisdiction over the
misconduct, its connection to the bribery was minimal. Telia’s
shares were traded on the NASDAQ from 2002 through
September 5, 2007, so it was an issuer during that period.142
However, it is not clear how much overlap there was when Telia
was a United States issuer and when the bribery was taking
place.143 The United States also based jurisdiction on the fact
that most of the improper transactions were made in U.S. dollars,
and that communications with Karimova were made, in part, via
e-mail accounts on U.S.-based servers.144
The other two countries involved in the enforcement action
were Sweden and the Netherlands. Sweden is where Telia is
incorporated, while three of Telia’s subsidiaries related to its
business in Eurasia were formed in the Netherlands.145 Clearly,
those two countries had a stronger connection to the case than did
the United States, but still the United States ended up with
hundreds of millions of dollars for the U.S. Treasury general fund.
In its resolution with the DOJ, Telia agreed to pay a $500,000
criminal fine; $40 million as forfeiture, part of COSCOM’s guilty
plea; and a criminal penalty of approximately $234 million.146
[hereinafter Telia Cease-and-Desist Order], https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/2017/34-81669.pdf.
141. Id. at 3–7.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Rohlfsen, Rojas & Scott, supra note 139.
144. Telia Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 140, at 2.
145. Id. at 2–3. Fintur Holdings B.V. “is a majority-owned subsidiary of
Telia and acts as a manager and holding company for many of the [sic] Telia’s
operating companies in the Eurasia business unit.” Id. at 3. TeliaSonera
UTA Holding B.V. “is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Telia and acts as one of
two intermediate holding companies of COSCOM.” Id. at 3. TeliaSonera
Uzbek Telecom Holding B.V. “is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Telia and acts
as one of two intermediate holding companies of COSCOM.” Id.
146. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 8, United States v. Telia Co. AB,
No. 17-CR-581-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/press-release/file/997851/download [https://perma.cc/UNX9-BRGL].
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Two hundred and seventy-four million dollars was to be paid to
the Dutch authorities for a potential prosecution in the
Netherlands, and if the Dutch penalty were to end up being less
than $274 million, the difference would be due to the U.S.
Treasury.147 In criminal penalties, the United States put
approximately $274.6 million, and possibly more, into the U.S.
Treasury for a case of foreign bribery in which the only ties to the
United States were some transactions made in U.S. dollars and
some emails sent from U.S. servers. The United States took more
than half of the total criminal penalties, despite the fact that the
Netherlands’ ties to the case were far more direct.
The SEC brought its own enforcement action against Telia,
requiring Telia to disgorge hundreds of millions of dollars in
profits.148 The SEC credited Telia for the $40 million forfeiture as
part of the DOJ resolution, but still required Telia to pay $208.5
million to the U.S. Treasury, and $208.5 million to the Swedish
and Dutch authorities.149 If the amounts paid to those authorities
were to end up being less than $208.5 million, the difference
would be due to the U.S. Treasury.150 Again, despite Sweden and
the Netherlands having much stronger ties to the case, the United
States collected more than half of the disgorged profits. The
United States, while technically having jurisdiction, had very
little actual connection to the bribery and yet collected more than
$483 million total from the DOJ and SEC resolutions. While some
might argue that the United States has an interest in protecting
its capital markets and financial institutions, is it enough of a
policy interest to justify these duplicative and excessive penalties?
2.

SBM Offshore N.V.

In November 2017, SBM Offshore N.V. (SBM), a Dutch oil
and gas drilling equipment company, entered into a DPA with the
DOJ to resolve foreign bribery charges.151 Between roughly 1996
147. Id. at 8–9.
148. Telia Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 140, at 8.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, SBM Offshore N.V. And United
States-Based Subsidiary Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case
Involving
Bribes
in
Five
Countries
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sbm-offshore-nv-and-united-states-basedsubsidiary-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-case [https://perma.cc/Q9XZ-
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and 2012, SBM engaged in systematic bribery, with illicit
payments made at multiple levels of the company, and the
payments themselves taking many different forms.152 SBM
executives facilitated commission payments to third-party agents,
knowing that part of those payments would be used to bribe
officials in numerous countries, including Brazil, Angola,
Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, and Iraq, to “secur[e] improper
advantages and obtain[] and retain[] business” with state-owned
oil companies in those countries.153 SBM either “earned or
expected to earn at least $2.8 billion” as a result of advantages
from the improper payments.154 SBM also sent foreign officials
“thank you” payments after being awarded business.155
Furthermore, SBM authorized some of its employees to make
smaller improper payments in kind to foreign officials in the form
of jewelry and electronics, and paid for foreign officials to take
trips to attend sporting events, while also providing them with
“spending money.”156 SBM also covered “tuition and living
expenses” for the relatives of foreign officials and employed
relatives of foreign officials.157
The U.S. jurisdictional connection to the case was SBM’s
Houston-based subsidiaries—domestic concerns for FCPA
purposes as companies incorporated in the United States.158 Also,
one of the SBM executives who “managed a significant portion of
the corrupt scheme” and “engaged in conduct within the
jurisdiction of the United States” was a U.S. citizen and therefore
also a domestic concern under the FCPA.159 Furthermore, the
“commission payments” made to one of the intermediaries, for the
purpose of facilitating bribes to Brazilian officials, were made to a
U.S. bank account.160
8EJ9].
152. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-7 to A-9, United States v. SBM
Offshore N.V., No. 17-686 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/press-release/file/1014801/download [https://perma.cc/HRU3-WNSB].
153. Id. at A-7.
154. Id. at A-7 to A-8.
155. Id. at A-8.
156. Id. at A-8 to A-9.
157. Id. at A-9.
158. Id. at A-1 to A-2.
159. Id. at A-4 to A-5.
160. Id. at A-10.
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In the U.S. enforcement action, SBM paid a total criminal
penalty of $238 million—$500,000 of which was a criminal fine
and $13.2 million of which was a forfeiture by SBM on behalf of its
U.S. subsidiary, which pleaded guilty to FCPA charges.161 The
DOJ credited SBM for the money already paid to the
Netherlands—a $40 million fine and $200 million disgorgement—
and for the predicted amount SBM would have to pay to resolve
charges in Brazil.162 In addition to crediting for penalties paid in
other jurisdictions, the DOJ also tried to impose a penalty that
would avoid “substantially jeopardiz[ing] the continued viability of
the Company . . . .”163 Despite those considerations, the
settlement money paid to the United States was nearly equivalent
to the penalties paid to the Netherlands, which is where SBM is
headquartered and publicly traded.164 The DOJ acknowledged
this in the DPA: “[E]ven though the Offices are crediting the full
amount paid in fines and forfeiture to the Dutch authorities in
connection with the Dutch resolution, the penalty owed in the
United States exceeds the amount paid to the Dutch
authorities.”165
In the SBM enforcement action, the country where the
company was publicly traded—the Netherlands—required the
disgorgement of profits. In the Telia enforcement action, the
United States required the disgorgement of profits, despite the
fact that Telia was publicly traded in Sweden. The U.S.
enforcement agencies did not make publicly clear why the
disgorgement was paid to the United States in one case but not in
the other. Furthermore, in both cases, the United States took half
of the total payment, even though the Netherlands had a stronger
connection to the case.
3. Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd.
In December 2017, Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd. (Keppel)
161. Id. at 12.
162. Id. at 13.
163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 12-13, A-1.
165. Id. at 5. It is likely that the DPA states that the penalties “exceed”
those paid to the Netherlands because technically the penalty paid to the
Netherlands was only $40 million—the disgorgement is not considered a
penalty.
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entered into a DPA with the DOJ to resolve charges that it had
bribed officials in Brazil.166 Keppel is a Singapore-based company
and the world’s largest builder of oil rigs.167 From around 2001 to
2014, Keppel paid approximately $55 million in bribes to officials
in Brazil to obtain and retain business commissioned by
Petrobras, a Brazilian state-owned oil company.168 Keppel made
more than $350 million in profits from the business it won in
Brazil in connection with the bribery scheme; the DPA states that
some of the profits were made by Keppel’s U.S. subsidiary, KOM
USA.169
That subsidiary was the U.S. jurisdictional connection to the
case, as it had entered into some of the “consulting agreements”
that facilitated the bribes.170 Keppel also made some of the
“consulting payments” to bank accounts in the United States,
166. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd. and
U.S. Based Subsidiary Agree to Pay $422 Million in Global Penalties to
Resolve Foreign Bribery Case. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/keppel-offshore-marine-ltd-and-us-based-subsidiary-agreepay-422-million-global-penalties [https://perma.cc/536P-MSEF].
167. Id.; Christie Smythe, Keppel Offshore to Pay $422 Million to End
Bribery Probe, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2017, 7:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-12-22/keppel-offshore-agrees-to-pay-422-million-toend-bribe-probe.
168. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-5, United States v. Keppel
Offshore & Marine Ltd., No. 17-CR-697 (KAM) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1020706/download
[https://perma.cc/BBD5-WSAX] [hereinafter Keppel DPA].
Brazilian
prosecutors launched an investigation in March 2014 known as Operacao
Lava Jato, or Operation Car Wash, which uncovered a bribery scheme in
which executives at Petrobras, and the politicians who appointed those
executives, accepted bribes to manipulate construction contract bids. Claire
Felter & Rocio Cara Labrador, Brazil’s Corruption Fallout, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazilscorruption-fallout [https://perma.cc/6DJF-DTNS]; Celso Barros, The Twilight
of Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Movement, THE ATLANTIC (July 28, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/temer-lularousseff-brazil-operation-carwash-corruption/535029/ [https://perma.cc/45RA4LMH]. As of October 2018, Operation Car Wash has resulted in over 200
convictions for various crimes. Felter & Cara Labrador, supra note 168.
Many politicians, including four former presidents of Brazil, have been
investigated; former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, referred to as the
mastermind behind the corruption scheme, was sentenced in May 2017 to
more than nine years in prison. Id.
169. Keppel DPA, supra note 168, at A-5.
170. Id.
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which the consultants then transferred out of the country.171
The DOJ determined that Keppel’s total criminal penalty
should be approximately $422 million but that only twenty-five
percent of that total should be paid to the U.S. Treasury.172 The
DOJ credited the amounts Keppel would have to pay to the
Brazilian and Singaporean authorities—approximately $211
million and $105.5 million respectively.173 However, should the
payments to the Brazilian and Singaporean authorities be less
than those amounts, the difference would be due to U.S.
Treasury.174 The DOJ took the same approach in the Telia
enforcement action, where if penalties paid to the Dutch and
Swedish authorities were less than what the United States
designated, the difference would be due to the U.S. Treasury.
Keppel is notable because both the supply-side country and
demand-side country brought enforcement actions. In other
words, a Singapore-based company supplied the bribes to
Brazilian officials and both Singapore and Brazil were involved in
enforcement. In Telia, the demand-side country, Uzbekistan, was
not involved; in SBM, Brazil was one of the demand-side countries
and did bring an enforcement action, but there were at least four
other demand-side countries that did not bring enforcement
actions. Given that the two countries with the strongest ties to
the case brought enforcement actions in Keppel’s case, it is
unclear what the U.S. policy interest was in bringing its own
action, and for taking such a large portion of the total global
criminal penalty. One commentator questioned whether this was
“piling on” by the United States:
Sure, the DOJ did credit amounts paid in connection with
the Singapore and Brazil enforcement actions, but is this
an instance in which the DOJ should simply have stepped
back? What is the policy interest (other than perhaps
filling U.S. Treasury coffers) in bringing an FCPA
enforcement action against a Singapore company for
allegedly bribing Brazilian officials when Singapore and
Brazil also brought enforcement actions based on the
171. Id.
172. Id. at 8–9.
173. Id. at 9.
174. Id.
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same conduct?175
In a way, Keppel looks like a step in the right direction
because the United States only took a quarter of the total criminal
penalty instead of half, like it did in Telia and SBM.
Furthermore, one could argue that the U.S. subsidiary’s
involvement actually makes a stronger case for U.S. enforcement.
However, if a company is already facing punishment by two other
countries, especially both the supply-side and the demand-side
countries, what effect does U.S. involvement really have? Are the
duplicative penalties really advancing a U.S. policy interest?
4.

Rolls-Royce plc

In January 2017, Rolls-Royce plc (Rolls-Royce) entered into a
DPA with the DOJ to resolve charges of FCPA violations.176 RollsRoyce, a U.K.-based company, manufactures and distributes
“power systems for the aerospace, defense, marine and energy
sectors.”177 From around 2000 to around 2013, Rolls-Royce’s
United States subsidiary, RRESI, made “over $35 million in
commission payments” to third-party agents, “knowing that
[those] payments would be used to bribe foreign officials on behalf
of Rolls-Royce and RRESI . . . .”178 The demand-side countries
included Thailand, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Angola, and
Iraq.179
Interestingly, the United States seemed to have a fairly
strong connection to this case, despite the portion of the total
175. Issues to Consider From the Keppel Offshore & Marine Enforcement
Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 26, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issuesconsider-keppel-offshore-marine-enforcement-action/ [https://perma.cc/99BFVGDD].
176. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Rolls-Royce plc Agrees to Pay $170
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case (Jan.
17,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rolls-royce-plc-agrees-pay-170million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act
[https://perma.cc/X26J-MAR4]). The Rolls-Royce enforcement action was
concluded at the end of the Obama administration; Telia, Keppel, and SBM
were concluded during the Trump administration.
177. Id.
178. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-5, United States v. Rolls-Royce
plc, 16-cr-247 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/927221/download [https://perma.cc/GBT4-2RXU]
[hereinafter
Rolls-Royce U.S. DPA].
179. Id.
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penalties it took, as discussed below. RRESI was a domestic
concern under the FCPA and two of the employees involved in the
bribery scheme were United States citizens, and therefore also
domestic concerns.180 Furthermore, RRESI engaged all five
intermediaries that then bribed government officials in each of the
demand-side countries named above.181
Rolls-Royce agreed to pay a U.S. penalty of nearly $170
million.182 That amount reflected a credit for the penalties RollsRoyce paid to the Brazilian authorities—approximately $25
million.183 Rolls-Royce also entered into a DPA with the U.K.’s
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) for paying bribes in connection with
its business in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia,
and Thailand.184 The United States DPA did not mention the
U.K. DPA, likely because the demand-side countries in each did
not overlap, with the exception of Thailand. The total U.K.
payment Rolls-Royce agreed to was approximately £487 million
(approximately $605 million).185 Approximately £58 million
(approximately $72 million) of that was disgorgement and
approximately £239 million (approximately $296 million) was a
financial penalty.186 Rolls-Royce also agreed to reimburse the
SFO for the costs of the investigation—£13 million (approximately
$16 million).187
Rolls-Royce paid approximately $800 million total to the three
countries involved in enforcement, but the United States took less
than a quarter of that.188 The United States subsidiary seemed to
be heavily involved in the bribery scheme, and most of the conduct
180. Id. at A-1 to A-2.
181. Id. at A-2 to A-3.
182. Id. at 9. Thirty million dollars of the total U.S. penalty was to be
paid to the Consumer Financial Fraud Fund; generally penalties and
disgorgement are paid to the U.S. Treasury general fund. It is unclear why
in this case part of the penalty was earmarked. Jansen, supra note 90.
183. Rolls-Royce U.S. DPA, supra note 178, at 9.
184. Press Release, supra note 176.
185. Id.
186. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, R. v. Rolls-Royce plc (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/rolls-royce-plc/ [https://perma.cc/9X7PS4H3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
187. Id. at 4. Unlike the United States, which generally requires payment
within ten days, the United Kingdom allowed Rolls-Royce to pay in four
installments, plus any interest. See id. at 4.
188. See Press Release, supra, note 176.
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covered by the U.K. DPA did not overlap. It is hard to reconcile
the U.S. involvement in this case with its involvement in Telia.189
III. TIME FOR A POLICY OF SELF-RESTRAINT AND TRANSPARENCY IN
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS?

There is nothing that legally prevents the United States from
bringing its own actions in multijurisdictional anti-bribery cases,
but it would be good public policy for the United States to show
self-restraint in these cases, as well as greater transparency in its
approach to penalties. A strict double jeopardy rule would not
make sense in FCPA cases because perhaps not all countries
prosecute anti-bribery cases as they should. However, U.S.
enforcement agencies might step back when the problem has been
reasonably addressed by other countries. The OECD Convention
and the DOJ’s “Petite Policy,” regarding state-federal successive
prosecutions, support adopting a policy of self-restraint and
transparency in multijurisdictional enforcement actions.190 While
the DOJ’s new policy against “piling on” is a step in the right
direction, the policy is vague and still does not give companies any
practical sense of when the DOJ will seek duplicative penalties.191
Furthermore, the SEC does not have an equivalent policy. Time
will tell if the new DOJ policy will create real predictability in
multijurisdictional enforcement actions.
A. The OECD Convention Addresses Overlapping Jurisdiction,
but Does Not Provide a Binding Mechanism
Article

4.3

of

the

OECD

Convention

addresses

the

189. It may be because the U.K. Bribery Act is a very strong anti-bribery
statute and the U.K. has started to enforce anti-bribery violations
aggressively. Steiger, supra note 9, at 160–61 (“[T]he new British statute has
been hailed as ‘the toughest anti-corruption legislation in the world.’”). The
U.K. Bribery Act has “ambitious” jurisdictional reach—if a company has a
presence in the United Kingdom, even if not the headquarters, the U.K. has
jurisdiction over any of that company’s foreign bribery violations, regardless
of whether the bribery took place in the U.K. or was related to U.K.
operations. Id. at 162 (“[I]f a U.S. company has a U.K. presence and engages
in prohibited acts in Asia, it could be prosecuted in the U.K. pursuant to the
Act.”).
190. See Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1342–44, 1350 n.184.
191. Rosenstein, supra note 27. The “piling on” policy is discussed in
detail in subsection C below.

200 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:167
inevitability of overlapping jurisdiction in foreign bribery cases.192
It states that “[w]hen more than one Party has jurisdiction over
an alleged offense described in this Convention, the Parties
involved shall, at the request of one of them, consult with a view
to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for
prosecution.”193 The use of the word “shall” seems to require the
parties to work together and devise a plan to ensure that the
company or individual in question is not subject to multiple
enforcement actions.194
Furthermore, the phrase “most
appropriate jurisdiction” seems to indicate that only one country
should prosecute.195
However, the way Article 4.3 is written indicates that the
obligations are only triggered when one country requests a
consultation.196 As one commentator notes, “[w]e may easily
dispense with the possibility that Article 4, paragraph 3 alone
creates a self-executing protection against double jeopardy.”197
The Fifth Circuit has also considered the meaning of Article 4.3
and concluded that the obligation to consult depends on one of the
countries formally requesting it.198 Unfortunately, there is
nothing in the official commentaries about this section, but
commentators have speculated about the drafters’ intent.199
“[T]he OECD Convention appears to envision a single prosecution
for cases of foreign bribery, [although] it certainly does not
advocate or insist upon that in every instance . . . .”200 “The
192. See OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4 ¶ 3. “The OECD
Convention clearly considered the possibility of multiple investigations.”
Davis, supra note 22, at 62.
193. OECD Convention, supra note 4, art. 4 ¶ 3.
194. See Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1344.
195. Id.
196. Id. “Having recognized the conditions that create a risk of multiple
investigations, the Convention provided for no legally enforceable ban on
multiple prosecutions . . . .” Davis, supra note 22, at 62.
197. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1344.
198. Id. at 1344–45 (referring to United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 711
(5th Cir. 2010)). In Jeong, a South Korean individual was convicted and
sentenced in South Korea for bribing American public officials, and then
indicted for the same conduct in the United States. See id. The court held
that Article 4.3 of the OECD Convention did not bar the U.S. action against
Jeong because neither the United States nor South Korea had made a formal
request for consultation. See id. (citing Jeong, 624 F.3d at 711).
199. Id. at 1345.
200. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 517 n.152.
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drafters clearly hoped that in the event of multiple investigations,
only one country would actually prosecute a given defendant.”201
It is therefore unclear what the effect of Article 4.3 really is.
It seems to mandate a single prosecution only in instances where
countries want that outcome, and even that is not entirely certain.
The Fifth Circuit, in dicta, interpreted the language of Article
4.3—“the Parties involved shall, at the request of one of them,
consult with a view to determining the most appropriate
jurisdiction”—to mean that determining “the most appropriate
jurisdiction for prosecution” is only a goal.202 However, it is odd
that the drafters would specifically address multijurisdictional
enforcement actions, particularly in a treaty with very few
provisions, and then provide a mechanism that essentially has no
teeth.203 The drafters seemed to anticipate the likelihood of
duplicative enforcement actions and the unfairness those
duplicative enforcement actions would create for companies. Each
country may have legitimate policy reasons for bringing its own
action, so a strict double jeopardy provision may not be the best
solution, but perhaps the spirit of Article 4.3 should be
incorporated into the U.S. approach to multijurisdictional
enforcement actions.204
B. The “Petite Policy” Regarding State-Federal Successive
Prosecutions
The U.S. Constitution protects criminal defendants against
double jeopardy—one cannot be “prosecuted or sentenced twice for
substantially the same offense.”205 However, U.S. protection
against double jeopardy is limited to successive prosecutions by a

201. Davis, supra note 22, at 62.
202. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1346 (emphasis added) (citing Jeong,
624 F.3d at 711).
203. See id. at 1326; see also Davis, supra note 22, at 62.
204. For an argument that the OECD should provide a binding protection
against double jeopardy, see Alistair Craig, OECD Should Protect Against
Multi-Country Enforcement, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:58 AM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/11/11/oecd-should-protect-against-multicountry-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/59WX-CE69].
205. Double Jeopardy, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see U.S
CONST. art. 5. In Europe and other parts of the world, this principle is known
as ne bis in idem. Davis, supra note 22, at 58.
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single sovereign.206 In other words, the federal government
cannot prosecute someone twice for the same offense; likewise, an
individual state cannot prosecute someone multiple times for the
same offense.207 However, the federal government can prosecute
someone already prosecuted by a state, and a state can prosecute
someone already prosecuted by the federal government.208 The
theory is that sovereigns have the right to enforce their own laws
and that “each sovereign’s laws address different interests.”209
This applies in the international context as well, because
individual countries are, of course, independent sovereigns.210
Therefore, in FCPA cases, double jeopardy will not protect a
company facing enforcement actions by multiple countries: foreign
prosecution will not bar the United States from bringing its own
action.211
Despite the fact that there is no constitutional protection
against successive prosecutions by both a state and the federal
government, the DOJ has its own internal policy against bringing
these actions and this policy could be adapted to apply to foreign
prosecutions in FCPA cases.212 Known formally as the “Dual and
Successive Prosecution Policy,” and informally as the “Petite
Policy,” it “precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal
prosecution, following a prior state or federal prosecution based on
206. Davis, supra note 22, at 63.
207. Id. at 63–64.
208. Id. at 64.
209. Thomas White, Limitations Imposed on the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
by Federal and State Governments, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 173, 174 (2011). One
commentator argues that in the anti-bribery context, each sovereign’s law
comes from the same ultimate source—the OECD Convention. Van Alstine,
supra note 18, at 1341. Each country adheres to the treaty by implementing
a law with certain requirements to target a specific offense. Id. This
undermines the primary reasoning behind the dual sovereign approach to
double jeopardy because “once each member state has assumed the
international law obligation, it is to that extent—in the words of the decisive
Supreme Court opinion on the dual sovereignty doctrine—no longer
‘independently . . . determin[ing] what shall be an offense against its
authority.’” Id.
210. See Davis, supra note 22, at 58.
211. See Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1322. “[T]he [Double Jeopardy]
clause . . . gives no weight to prosecutions abroad.” Davis, supra note 22, at
63–64. “[A]ny legal argument that a U.S. authority lacks the power to
investigate or prosecute because another country has already done so will go
nowhere.” Id. at 65.
212. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 520–21.
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substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s) . . . .”213 There are
three criteria pursuant to which the DOJ will set aside this policy:
(1) if the matter involves a “substantial federal interest”; (2) the
prior prosecution “ha[s] left that interest demonstrably
unvindicated”; and (3) the DOJ believes that the conduct in
question actually constitutes a violation of federal law and that
there is enough evidence to gain a conviction.214 This policy does
not provide defendants with any legal protections—it is merely a
self-imposed guideline for the DOJ, although generally abided by
“in the sense that the federal government rarely engages in double
prosecution domestically.”215
The Petite Policy’s background provides strong support for
applying it to FCPA cases. It originated from U.S. Attorney
General William Rogers’ memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys’
offices, addressing the Supreme Court cases that established there
is no violation of double jeopardy in state-federal successive
prosecutions.216 The memorandum stated:
[T]he mere existence of a power, of course, does not mean
that it should necessarily be exercised
It is our duty
to observe not only the rulings of the Court but the spirit
of the rulings as well. In effect, the Court said that
although the rule of the Lanza case is sound law,
enforcement officers should use care in applying it.
Applied indiscriminately and with bad judgment it, like
most rules of law, could cause considerable hardship . . . .
[T]hose of us charged with law enforcement
responsibilities have a particular duty to act wisely and
with self-restraint in this area
We should continue
to make every effort to cooperate with state and local
authorities to the end that the trial occur in the
jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where the
public interest is best served.217
213. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 77, § 9-2.031(A); Davis, supra
note 22, at 64.
214. U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 77, § 9-2.031(A).
215. Davis, supra note 22, at 64; Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice
Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary Justice, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
167, 169, 179–80 (2004).
216. White, supra note 206, at 196.
217. Id. at 197 n.178.
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Accepting that double jeopardy does not apply in
multijurisdictional anti-bribery enforcement actions, the fact that
the United States can bring an action does not mean that, as
stated in the memo, that the power “should necessarily be
exercised.”218 Furthermore, it makes sense for U.S. enforcement
agencies to “act wisely and with self-restraint” in
multijurisdictional enforcement actions and to cooperate with
other countries’ authorities to ensure that the action is brought
“where the public interest is best served.”219
That is not to say that the United States should not be able to
bring its own action if there is a strong policy interest. The Petite
Policy lays out situations in which the federal government has a
strong interest in bringing its own action after a state has already
done so, several of which would apply well to FCPA cases.220 For
example, the federal government has an interest if there was no
conviction in the first case as a result of “incompetence,
corruption, intimidation, or undue influence.”221 In a foreign
bribery case, the country with the strongest jurisdictional ties
might decline to prosecute for any of these reasons, and in that
situation, the United States should be able to bring its own action.
Even if the United States is not the most appropriate country to
prosecute, the bad actor should not go unpunished.
Another situation in which the Petite Policy deems the federal
government to have an interest is when the first case did result in
a conviction but “the prior sentence was manifestly inadequate in
light of the federal interest involved and a substantially enhanced
sentence—including forfeiture and restitution as well as
imprisonment and fines—is available through the contemplated
federal prosecution . . . .”222 U.S. enforcement agencies may
already be using this as justification for involvement in
multijurisdictional enforcement actions where U.S. ties are
weak—they might think that other countries’ fines and penalties
are insufficient. If this is in fact the justification, it would be
fairer to companies to make this publicly known, and to be clear
about why the other countries’ fines and penalties are insufficient.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 77, § 9-2.031(D).
Id.
Id.
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Transparency will create more predictability in the outcome.
Lastly, the Petite Policy establishes four reasons for selfrestraint in state-federal successive prosecutions: (1) “to vindicate
substantial federal interests through appropriate federal
prosecutions”; (2) “to protect persons charged with criminal
conduct from the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions
and punishments for substantially the same act(s) or
transaction(s)”; (3) “to promote efficient utilization of Department
resources”; and (4) “to promote coordination and cooperation
between federal and state prosecutors.”223 All four of these are
strong reasons to implement a policy of self-restraint in FCPA
cases.
C. The New DOJ Policy Against “Piling On”
On May 9, 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein
announced a new DOJ policy against “piling on,” to be
incorporated into the United States Attorneys’ Manual.224 The
policy, while not specific to the FCPA, encourages cooperation
between different DOJ units and other enforcement agencies, both
foreign and domestic, to avoid duplicative penalties for the same
misconduct.225 Rosenstein, who announced the new policy during
a speech to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute,
stated that “[i]t is important for [the DOJ] to be aggressive in
pursuing wrongdoers. But we should discourage disproportionate
enforcement of laws by multiple authorities.”226 Like the Petite
Policy, this new policy against “piling on” is not enforceable, but
according to Rosenstein, is “another step towards greater
transparency and consistency in corporate enforcement.”227
Rosenstein cited several reasons for the new policy. First, he
noted that companies in highly regulated industries must answer
to multiple regulatory authorities, which “creates a risk of
repeated punishments that may exceed what is necessary to
rectify the harm and deter future violations.”228 Second, he
explained that attorneys within the DOJ were concerned about
223. Id. § 9-2.031(A).
224. Rosenstein, supra note 27.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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duplicative penalties and the impact those duplicative penalties
have on the DOJ’s reputation for fairness; those attorneys were in
favor of increased cooperation “to achieve reasonable and
proportionate outcomes.”229 Lastly, Rosenstein cited the negative
consequences of “piling on” to companies and the enforcement
agencies: companies, including “innocent employees, customers,
and investors,” are left uncertain as to whether the issue has been
fully resolved, and DOJ resources are perhaps not used in the
most efficient manner.230
The new policy has four components.231 First, the DOJ
should not use enforcement for reasons unrelated to the criminal
activity in question—a reiteration of existing policy.232 Second,
DOJ units should coordinate with each other to “achieve an
overall equitable result,” which may include crediting for
penalties, fines, and forfeitures.233 Third, DOJ attorneys are
encouraged, “when possible,” to coordinate with other enforcement
agencies—federal, state, local, and foreign—that seek to resolve
cases for the same underlying misconduct.234 The last component
lists several factors to be considered when determining whether to
impose duplicative penalties: “the egregiousness of the
wrongdoing; statutory mandates regarding penalties; the risk of
delay in finalizing a resolution; and the adequacy and timeliness
of a company’s disclosures and cooperation with the
Department.”235
The last component of the policy is key: the DOJ will seek to
avoid “piling on,” but only in certain situations. Rosenstein in fact
made a statement to that effect: “Sometimes, penalties that may
229. Id.
230. Id. “We need to think about whether devoting resources to additional
enforcement against an old scheme is more valuable than fighting a new
one.” Id.
231. Id. In addition to the four components, Rosenstein also reemphasized the DOJ’s commitment to prosecuting individuals, as outlined in
the 2015 Yates Memo. Id.; Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy
Att’y Gen., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://
perma.cc/8MX3-GE3D].
232. Rosenstein, supra note 27.
233. Id.
234. Id. Rosenstein cites Keppel as an example of this type of coordinated
resolution. Id.
235. Id.
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appear duplicative really are essential to achieve justice and
protect the public. In those cases, we will not hesitate to pursue
complete remedies, and to assist our law enforcement partners in
doing the same.”236 While the listed factors may give companies
some indication of whether the DOJ will seek duplicative
penalties, it is questionable how much the factors will really
help.237 For example, how is a company to determine how
egregious the DOJ will perceive the wrongdoing?
Rosenstein also cited the practical concerns of cooperation as
a reason duplicative penalties are imposed, such as limits on
information-sharing, the timing of each agency’s action, and
diplomatic relations.238 This further undercuts the effect of the
policy from the perspective of companies—a company deciding
whether to voluntarily disclose may not be able to use these
factors to assess whether duplicative penalties will be imposed.239
The DOJ’s acknowledgment of duplicative fines as an issue is
a positive sign.240 However, the policy’s language is vague and
contains ideas that seem to undercut the policy’s goals. Time will
tell if the policy is an effective solution to the problem.
IV. CONCLUSION

Foreign bribery is a serious concern for international business
and it hurts the people who live in the countries where bribes are
taken.241 The United States, through the FCPA, has made
significant progress in this area, leveling the playing field and
236. Id.
237. See Lara A. Covington & Michael E. Hantman, New DOJ Policy
Against Piling On Has Rewards, with Strings Attached, FCPA BLOG (May 17,
2018, 7:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/5/17/covington-andhantman-new-doj-policy-against-piling-on-has-r.html [https://perma.cc/54LQ96AM].
238. Rosenstein, supra note 27.
239. These practical concerns also do not explain the duplicative penalties
in global settlements, such as Telia and Keppel.
240. See Alex Brackett & Mark Earley Jr., DOJ Enforcement Policy
Announcements Provide Promising Guidance, FCPA BLOG (May 23, 2018,
8:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/5/23/brackett-and-earley-dojenforcement-policy-announcements-pro.html [https://perma.cc/EVD5-CJ2G].
241. Wrage, supra note 6; Corruption: Cost for Developing Countries,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L
UK,
http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/
corruption-statistics/corruption-cost-for-developing-countries/#.WsU4QyPMz
OQ [https://perma.cc/DS6F-PDSW].
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weeding out corruption. However, now that the rest of the world
is catching up, the United States might consider adopting a policy
of self-restraint in foreign bribery cases where its connection is
minimal and when other countries with stronger ties are bringing
enforcement actions. There is nothing wrong with overlapping
jurisdiction as long as the aggressive enforcers keep themselves in
check, and as long as they do so, there is no need for strict
adherence to double jeopardy principles. However, in cases where
the United States does feel it needs to be involved and the
connection is not obvious, the enforcement agencies should be
clear and transparent about the policy reasons for involvement
and the portion of global settlement money taken for the U.S.
Treasury.

